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The main objective of this paper is to suggest reform measures to address the gaps and 
weaknesses in emerging Asia's financial regulatory and supervisory systems, on the 
basis of lessons drawn from the global crisis. For emerging Asia, the direct impact of the 
global financial crisis has been limited, thus generating substantially less pressure for 
financial restructuring and regulatory reform than is the case in developed economies. 
However, the underlying causes of the current turmoil—such as the dynamics of 
financial innovation and globalization—remain relevant for the region. As the world 
embraces wide-ranging financial reforms, emerging Asia will face dramatic changes in 
the global financial landscape. The region's authorities need to be prepared for the 
changing regulatory environment and proactive in strengthening their national regulatory 
and supervisory frameworks, in line with higher regulatory standards emanating from 
global reforms. Financial regulators will also need to design an effective and coherent 
framework for cross-border crisis management, and work towards a potential 
international regulatory and surveillance system. 
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Financial crises often provide impetus and opportunity for overdue regulatory reform. As 
in past crises, the current turmoil exposed shortcomings in supervisory, regulatory, and 
prudential frameworks. This has led national authorities—together with regional and 
global financial institutions—to reexamine approaches to financial regulation and 
supervisory oversight. As the crisis continues to reshape the global financial architecture, 
wide-ranging reforms and a regulatory overhaul is under discussion to address apparent 
weaknesses and gaps.  
 
The unprecedented global financial crisis has prompted a reassessment of financial 
regulatory systems worldwide. By and large, emerging Asia's
1 financial  systems  and 
institutions have been shielded from the direct impact of the global financial crisis. Thus, 
the region faces substantially less pressure for financial restructuring and regulatory 
reform. Nonetheless, the underlying causes of the current turmoil—based on the 
dynamics of financial innovation and globalization—accent the need to better supervise 
financial institutions and safeguard financial stability.  
 
Asia cannot be insulated from the impact of financial crises spawned elsewhere. The 
resilience of Asia’s banking systems can, in part, be attributed to the reforms 
implemented following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. However, the risk-assessment 
capabilities of existing regulatory systems are clearly insufficient and must be 
supplemented in a way that reflects emerging new risks and challenges. With the crisis 
well into its second year, lessons drawn from recent events have led to specific reform 
proposals with concrete implementation plans in various global forums. Two major 
shortcomings in the modern global financial system are shaping an array of possible 
regulatory, supervisory, and prudential reforms. First, supervisors failed to stop 
excessive risk-taking and leveraging by financial institutions. Market failures, due in part 
to rapid financial innovation, discredited the regulatory model that relied on transparency, 
disclosure, and market discipline to curb inordinate risk-taking. Second, the absence of 
well-established crisis management mechanism, which was revealed in the failure to 
quickly address impaired financial institutions—both local and international, sapped 
confidence from the system.   
 
The mandate for the region's authorities is clear: to be proactive in strengthening their 
respective national regulatory and supervisory frameworks, in line with higher regulatory 
standards emanating from global reforms. The crisis has also highlighted the need for a 
coordinated approach beyond national borders. National regulators should form regional 
and global alliances to establish a mechanism that can effectively monitor cross-border 
financial activities that could potentially threaten national, regional, and global financial 
stability. Together with global regulatory authorities, the region's financial regulators also 
need to design an effective and coherent framework for cross-border crisis management, 
and work towards a possible international regulatory and surveillance system.   
                                                  
1  Throughout this paper, “Emerging Asia” refers to 10 selected economies of developing Asia: the 
People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the 
Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand.  2          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 34  
 
Following a brief survey of the lessons drawn from the crisis, this paper will review the 
status of emerging Asia’s financial systems, the authorities' responses to the crisis, and 
existing regulatory systems. This paper will then focus on reform measures and related 
issues with strong implications for emerging Asia’s financial systems. With discussions 
over specific reforms underway in the global arena, the proposed reform measures will 
serve to underpin the region's active participation in shaping a new global financial 




2.  Global Lessons: What Went Wrong? 
 
A confluence of macroeconomic and structural factors contributed to the current crisis, 
highlighting an inadequate financial policy and regulatory framework. The existing 
regulatory and supervisory system clearly failed to prevent systemic risk from 
undermining financial stability. Regulatory gaps between different market segments and 
products, fragmented supervision, and inadequate information to protect investors and 
encourage market discipline all contributed to the incidence of systemic risk crippling the 
global banking and financial system. While there are many lessons to draw from the 
crisis, there are five broad lessons pertinent to reform considerations for Asia's financial 
systems. 
•  Global and national regulatory structures have not kept up with market 
innovation over the past decade, creating gaps across products and 
services that allow excessive leverage and risk-taking.  
The crisis exposed important weaknesses and gaps in regulations and their 
coverage in a number of countries. Innovation is often driven by regulatory 
arbitrage, or the desire to avoid regulatory requirements on banks and other 
deposit-taking institutions. These include minimal capital and liquidity ratios, 
various prudential constraints on permissible assets and liabilities, governance 
requirements, and reporting obligations. For example, securitization is a useful 
tool that can transfer risks from those who originate to those who are better able 
to manage them. However, it has also allowed banks to build off-balance sheet 
leverage. Deregulation has obscured the boundaries between banks and 
nonbank financial institutions in terms of the products and services they offer. 
Cross-border finance has accelerated, increasing financial interdependence 
globally. But the absence of clear mechanisms for information sharing and 
monitoring global transactions contributed to the rapid spread of financial panic 
as the crisis gained strength.  
•  Excessive maturity transformation, with greater reliance on market-based 
wholesale funding, has made the financial system susceptible to a sudden 
shift in investor sentiment and market liquidity conditions.  
Greater reliance on market-based wholesale funding tends to generate a false 
sense of liquidity in times of relative market calm. But in a time of market distress, 
elevated uncertainty may lead to a collective failure of liquidity provision in the Beyond the Crisis: Financial Regulatory Reform in Emerging Asia  |       3 
 
 
market. Prior to the current crisis, a largely unregulated shadow banking system
2 
showed phenomenal growth with a massive build-up of off-balance sheet 
leverage. These shadow banking institutions were not subject to the rigorous 
prudential regulations required of depository banks, thus allowing excessive 
leverage and risk-taking. The popular and growing use of structured investment 
vehicles and other conduits also contributed to the expansion of the shadow 
banking system. However, these nonbank financial institutions tend to rely on 
wholesale funding sources, rather than relatively less volatile retail deposits. With 
their high leverage ratios, the rollover needs for short-term funding became acute 
during the crisis. Also, system-wide deleveraging has forced regulated financial 
institutions to liquidate positions during market distress, exacerbating the liquidity 
crisis. 
•  Spillovers and externalities were evident during the crisis, reflecting high 
levels of financial interdependence including, for example, the transfer of 
risk through complex securitized products.  
The financial crisis illustrated how the collapse of a systemically significant global 
financial institution—or a sharp, rapid deterioration in an asset class—can have 
far-reaching impacts on global markets and financial systems. Dramatic changes 
in the financial landscape driven by innovation, deregulation, and globalization in 
the past few decades have increased financial interdependence across 
institutions, market segments, and national borders. The emergence of global 
financial conglomerates has also contributed to this. However, the crisis revealed 
that this strong interdependence has not been fully appreciated by the regulators, 
while the complexity of financial innovation often undermines the capacity of risk 
managers. For example, growth in securitization and structured credit products
3 
has been phenomenal in recent years. While such innovations allowed banks to 
manage risks more effectively by adjusting their exposure to different types of 
credit risk, the lack of transparency created by these complex credit products has 
made it difficult to assess their underlying value. The high leverage embedded in 
these products also blurred the size of commitment in each layer of securitization, 
obscuring the degree of risk exposure.  
•  Misaligned incentives in compensation schemes, credit ratings, and the 
originate-to-distribute model were also exposed by the crisis.  
                                                  
2  The shadow banking system refers to nonbank financial institutions that play an increasingly critical role 
in lending. For example, a hedge fund may channel funds from an investor to a corporation, profiting 
either from management fees or from interest rate differentials between investor and borrower. 
3  Structured credit products such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) arise from a pool of debts, 
which is then partitioned into different tranches representing different degrees of risk and sold off to 
investors with different risk appetites. CDOs bundle various types of debt into securities structured in 
such a way that losses from defaults are borne successively, in their entirety, from low-ranking through 
to high-ranking tranches, thus protecting the latter from the immediate loss. CDO tranches are then 
awarded credit ratings based on the layers of protection given to each tranche by the subordinate (i.e., 
lower) tranches as well as the credit quality of the underlying collateral. In this process, these structured 
securities are effectively severed from the credit risk of the original issuer of collateralized debts and 
rely solely on their own credit ratings. This means that a CDO tranche that includes unrated “junk” 
assets in its mix of assets used as collateral could still be AAA-rated. 4          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 34  
 
Faulty incentive structures contributed to excessive leveraging and risk-taking. 
First, the remuneration and incentive schemes of financial institutions 
encouraged managers to take excessive risks by focusing on short-term returns. 
Second, misaligned incentives faced by credit rating agencies in supplying 
ratings and offering advisory services likely contributed to overly positive ratings 
for complex financial instruments and the underestimation of risk. Third, the 
originate-to-transfer model may have contributed to a decline in due diligence in 
lending by reducing incentives to monitor the credit quality of underlying assets in 
structured credit products. 
•  Certain regulations reinforced the procyclicality of financial systems, 
exacerbating market stress as the crisis developed.  
The regulatory system was inadequate in accounting for risks associated with 
boom–bust cycles at the macro level. In some cases, prudential requirements 
even encouraged the procyclical behavior of banking systems. For example, 
several provisions in the Basel II framework appear to encourage banks to 
decrease the amount of capital they hold during business cycle expansions and 
increase them during contractions—the result of mark-to-market accounting, 
variations in specific provisioning and related risk-weighted capital requirements, 
and changes in perceived risk using the Value-at-Risk (VaR) model.  
 
 
3.  Asia’s Responses: What Makes Asia Different? 
3.1  Banking and Financial Systems 
The direct impact of the global crisis on Asian financial systems has been minimal (ADB 
2008, 2009). Limited direct exposure to mortgage-related assets in the United States 
(US) shielded Asian banking systems from massive losses (Figure 1). Of the total 
USD1.5 trillion in writedowns and credit losses reported worldwide since July 2007, only 
USD39.0 billion, or about 2.7%, comes from Asian financial institutions—the bulk of 
which is concentrated in Japan and, to a lesser extent, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). Along with Asian banks’ continued ability to raise fresh capital, this allowed the 
region's banking systems to remain generally well-capitalized and liquid.  
 Across the region, banks play a dominant role in financial intermediation (Figure 2). The 
relative soundness of the region’s banking systems has helped the region's financial 
systems to continue financing real economic activity. Banks across the region entered 
this period of crisis in relatively good shape, owing in part to improved risk management 
practices. Banks generally hold comfortable credit and liquidity cushions, with the ratio of 
nonperforming loans to total loans having decreased sharply since the 1997/98 Asian 
financial crisis (Table 1). Loan-to-deposit ratios have come down across the region as 
well, with the exception of India, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea (Korea). The post-
1997/98 crisis reforms also reflected the structural weaknesses embedded in the 
perilous combination of a highly leveraged corporate sector and weak bank oversight. 
The region's corporate sector now appears to be in good shape with rising profitability 
and declining gearing ratios (Table 2). Despite the global run-up in housing prices prior Beyond the Crisis: Financial Regulatory Reform in Emerging Asia  |       5 
 
 
to the 2008 crisis, the region's households also appear to hold relatively healthy financial 
positions as well (Table 3). With the exception of Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China, 
household debt and mortgages in emerging Asian economies remain low as a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) compared with Europe and, in particular, 
the US. While these indicators show the region’s banks are sound overall, pockets of 
weakness remain with new challenges emerging.  
 
Figure 1: Write downs and Capital Raised by Major Banks since 3Q2007 




Figure 2: Importance of Banks Relative to the Non-Bank Financial Sector
1 
(Total assets in % of GDP, period average) 
 
 
1Average value for People's Rep. of China (PRC) for 2002-2007; Hong Kong, China (HKG) for 2000-2007; 
India (IND) for March 2000 to March 2008; Indonesia (INO) for 2001-2007; Korea, Rep. of (KOR) for 2000-
2008; Malaysia (MAL) for 2000-2007; Philippines (PHI) for 2000-2008; Singapore (SIN) for 2000-2008; 
Taipei,China (TAP) for 2000-2008; and Thailand (THA) for 2000-2008. 
Sources: OREI staff calculations using data from national sources; CEIC; and World Economic Outlook 
Database (April 2009), International Monetary Fund. 6          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 34  
 
Table 1: Banking Sector Indicators (%) 
 
Nonperforming 














   2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 
China, People's  
Rep. of  22.4 2.5  13.5 8.2 4.7 115.3  95.2  69.6 
Hong Kong, China  5.9  1.2 17.8 14.7  —  — 66.7 47.3 
India 12.8  2.3  11.1  13.0  — 52.6 63.0 75.3 
Indonesia 20.1  3.2  12.5  16.8 36.1 98.5 39.2 80.1 
Korea, Republic of  6.6  1.2 10.5 12.7 81.8  155.4 111.5 134.1 
Malaysia 9.7  2.2  12.5  12.2 57.2 88.9  108.8 92.8 
Philippines 15.1  3.5  16.2 15.7 43.7 86.0 82.0 78.3 
Singapore 3.4  1.4  19.6  14.3 87.2  119.9 99.7 85.3 
Taipei,China 5.3  1.5  10.8 10.8 24.1 76.6 77.5 73.1 
Thailand 17.7  5.3  11.9  14.1 47.2 97.9  102.3 97.7 
Average
5 11.9  2.4  13.6  13.3  47.7 99.0 84.6 83.4 
Median 11.3  2.3  12.5  13.6 45.5 97.9 88.6 79.2 
    eurozone
1 —  1.5  —  7.9  —  —  135.0  138.5 
    Japan  5.3  1.5  11.7 12.3 35.5 24.9 58.5 73.9 
    United States  1.1  2.3 12.4 12.5  146.4 84.7 110.6 109.2 
 
—  =  not  available.            
1 Nonperforming loan ratios for commercial banks, except for eurozone and Taipei,China for banking system; Japan for 
major banks; and United States for all FDIC-insured institutions. Data for Hong Kong, China in 2008 refers to gross 
substandard, doubtful, and loss loans.                                                                                       
Data for Japan, Singapore, and the United States as of September 2008. Value for India as of March 2008; and 
eurozone as of end-2007. 
2 Risk-weighted capital adequacy ratios for commercial banks except for China, People's Rep. of (PRC), eurozone, and 
Taipei,China banking systems; Japan major banks; and United States all FDIC-insured institutions.                      
Values for the Philippines are on consolidated basis; while eurozone data includes non-IFRS reporting countries only.                                             
Data for PRC in 2000 for state commercial banks only.  
Data for Singapore as of September 2008; and for PRC and India of as of March 2008.         
3 Data for Japan; Korea, Rep. of; Singapore; and United States in 2008 as of September 2008; Indonesia as of August 
2008; and India as of March 2008.                   
Values for Indonesia are write-off reserve on earning assets to classified earning assets ratio, while those for Malaysia 
refer to general, specific, and interest-in-suspense provisions. Data for PRC in 2000 for state commercial banks only.   
4 Covers loans to private sector or nonfinancial corporations, and deposits of banking institutions, other depository 
corporations, or deposit money banks.                                                                                    
Private sector loans-to-deposit data for Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, and United States in 2000 are end-2001 
v a l u e s .             
5 Simple  average.            
Source: Global Financial Stability Report, and International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; and national 
s o u r c e s .             
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Table 2: Corporate Sector Indicators
1 












   2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 
China, People's  
 Rep. of  4.5 4.6  621.5  38.5 2.7 1.3 5.1 9.3 0.6 0.3 
Hong Kong, China  11.6  7.4  9.7  24.5 1.7 1.2 9.0 11.5  0.2  0.1 
India 5.7  8.5  33.0  25.7  2.9 1.8 5.2 9.0 0.5 0.5 
Indonesia 6.5  6.5  0.0 35.5  5.2  1.9  3.4 9.9 1.1 0.5 
Korea, Rep. of  3.0 2.0 1.3  26.9 3.9 1.3 3.4 7.6 0.8 0.6 
Malaysia 4.1  4.6  10.3  22.5  2.3 1.7 4.5 6.7 0.5 0.4 
Philippines 3.3  4.4  0.5  16.8 3.1 2.5 3.4 5.2 0.8 0.5 
Singapore 4.4  6.7  5.8  25.3  1.1 1.0 8.1  12.7 0.0 0.2 
Taipei,China 7.5  3.1  19.7  6.0 1.3 0.9  11.2  13.9 0.3 0.2 
Thailand 0.8  4.7  3.0  36.2  4.8 1.6 2.3 9.3 1.9 0.6 
Average
2 5.2  5.2  70.5  25.8  2.9  1.5 5.5 9.5 0.7 0.4 
Median 4.4  4.6  7.8  25.5  2.8 1.5 4.8 9.3 0.6 0.4 
   eurozone  3.9  3.8  -1.4  -0.8 1.5 1.6 8.2 7.0 0.5 0.7 
   Japan  0.8  2.0  1.1  1.3  1.2 0.6 6.4  18.3 0.9 0.6 
   United States  5.7  4.6  7.0 10.6  2.2  1.8  6.7 7.2 0.7 0.6 
 
y - o - y   =   y e a r - o n - y e a r .             
1 Data  for  all  listed  non-financial  companies.          
2 Simple  average.            
N o t e s :             
Return on assets = (net income/total assets)*100.               
Interest expense/assets = (interest expense/total assets)*100.             
Interest coverage ratio = earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA)/interest expense.     
Net income represents income after removing all operating and non-operating income and expense, reserves, income 
taxes, minority interest, and extraordinary items of listed non-financial companies.         
Total assets represent the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, 
other investments, net property plant and equipment, and other assets of listed non-financial companies.     
Net sales represent gross sales and other operation revenues less discount, returns, and allowance of listed non-
financial  companies.            
Net debt represents total debt minus cash of all listed non-financial companies.          
Common equity represents common shareholders' investment in listed non-financial companies.       
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Table 3: Household Sector Indicators 
Household 




Loans (% of GDP)
1 
Housing Prices  
















2001 2008  2001  2008  Average  
2001–2007 2008 Current  Current  Latest 
China, People's 
Rep. of  — —  5.1  11.6  6.3  7.1  80  55  — 
Hong Kong, China  61.3  52.3  49.8 38.8  3.2  17.3  60–90  45-50  0.1 
India  3.1  10.5  1.2 5.5  — —  75  — — 
Indonesia 5.6  11.6  1.2  2.5  6.9 5.5 — — 2.3 
Korea, Rep. of  24.7  37.9  13.3 23.4  6.7  4.0 40–60  40  0.7 
Malaysia 43.8  48.5  24.4  26.0  3.1 4.0 — — 5.6 
Philippines 2.2  6.4  1.4  2.1  —  —  —  —  7.5 
Singapore —  50.8  28.0  34.8 2.1  13.4  90  none  0.5 
Taipei,China  43.3  54.0  26.6  38.4  — —  —  — — 
Thailand 10.8  17.9  7.1  9.6 3.1  -1.1  70–90  none — 
Average
5   24.3  32.2  15.8  19.3  4.5 7.2  81.7  47.5 2.8 
Median 17.7  37.9  10.2  17.5  3.2 5.5  80.0  47.5 1.5 
    eurozone  44.4  52.7  28.6 37.6  6.4  1.7  —  —  — 
    Japan  19.7  22.4  15.0  19.5  -4.2  -1.2  90  25-40  — 
    United States  95.6  120.8  76.4 102.6  6.7  -5.7  70–95  45  7.9 
—  =  not  available.             
DTI = mortgage debt to income ratio, GDP = gross domestic product, LTV = mortgage loans to value ratio, y-o-y = year-on-year. 
              
1 Values for Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand refer to loans from commercial banks and financing companies; People's Republic of 
China (PRC) from financial institutions; Hong Kong, China from authorized institutions; India for scheduled commercial banks; Rep. of 
Korea from commercial and specialized banks; Malaysia from commercial and investment banks; Philippines and Taipei,China from the 
banking system; eurozone from monetary and financial institutions; Japan from domestic licensed banks; and United States from 
financial system. Data for PRC and India in 2008 refers to 2007 values.             
2 Values for PRC; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Singapore; and eurozone refer to residential property price index. Data for Korea, Rep. 
of; Malaysia; Thailand; and United States refer to housing price index. Data for Japan refers to urban residential land price index.   
3 Limits for the United States are from Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae; Japan from Japan Housing Finance Agency; Hong Kong, China 
from Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation; and Thailand from Government Housing Bank. For India, LTV ratio equal to or less than 75% 
will have a risk weight of 50% or 75% depending on the sanctioned amount of the loan; LTV ratio above 75% will have a risk weight of 
100% regardless of the sanctioned amount of the loan.       
4 Values for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore refer to nonperforming housing loans ratio. For Korea, Rep. of; Philippines 
and United States, housing loans are 30 days or more in arrears; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; and Singapore 3 months or more in 
arrears; and Malaysia 6 months or more in arrears. Data from the banking system for most; except for Malaysia and United States for 
commercial banks; and Hong Kong, China for retail banks. Data for Singapore as of September 2008; Indonesia as of December 2008; 
Korea, Rep. of as of February 2009; and Hong Kong, China; Malaysia; Philippines and United States as of March 2009.    
5 Simple average.   
        
Source: National sources accessed through CEIC and various websites; Federal Reserve System; European Central Bank; and World 
Economic Outlook Database (April 2009), International Monetary Fund.   Beyond the Crisis: Financial Regulatory Reform in Emerging Asia  |       9 
 
 
The quality of banks’ risk management in the region has been strengthened 
substantially, but vulnerabilities could still arise from new lines of banking business and 
the legal and structural impediments that remain. For example, the region's banking 
systems now lend more to the household sector and invest more in securities. 
Deterioration in housing and/or financial asset markets could still make a visible dent in 
banks’ balance sheets. Also, slower growth often reveals vulnerabilities hidden below 
the surface during the high-growth period. With economies in the doldrums, the region's 
banking systems face a tougher business environment. Corporate defaults tend to rise 
with economic difficulty, increasing nonperforming loans. And finally, despite the 
significant progress made as a result of post-1997/98 crisis reforms, legal and market 
infrastructure remain underdeveloped in many of the region's economies, with 
institutional support for risk management still wanting.  
Financial contagion is also an important risk factor for the region's financial systems. The 
countries most affected by the crisis have been those with (i) banking systems that 
depend heavily on short-term foreign currency funding, (ii) high foreign participation in 
local equity markets, and (iii) current account deficits. Volatility in the movement of 
foreign portfolio investments—short-term funds placed in stocks, bonds, and banks' 
overseas borrowing—posed a significant risk during the crisis (Figures 3a, 3b, 3c). 
Exposure to short-term external funds adversely affected the performance of regional 
currencies amid greater uncertainty about the continuity and stability of those foreign 
currency funds. In the wake of the crisis, massive deleveraging by global financial 
institutions tightened credit conditions. As international financial conditions worsened 
even further, repatriation by foreign financial institutions accelerated and the investment 
climate turned sour. Capital outflows surged in the final quarter of 2008 due to the re-
pricing of risk and unwinding of the “carry trade.”
4 Despite the large build-up of foreign 
exchange reserves since the 1997/98 crisis, some emerging Asian economies 

















                                                  
4  "Carry trade" often refers to an investment strategy where an investor earns the spread between 
borrowing a low-yielding asset and lending a high-yielding one. For example, an investor can borrow in 
a low-yielding currency and invest in a high-yielding currency. 10          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 34  
 
Figure 3a: Financial Account Flows—Emerging Asia  
(excl. People's Rep. of China and India) (% of GDP) 
 
Note: Emerging Asia includes Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Korea Rep. of; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; 
Taipei,China; and Thailand. 
Other Investment includes financial derivatives. 




Figure 3b: Financial Account Flows—People's Rep. of China (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Data sourced from the International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund and national sources. 
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Figure 3c: Financial Account Flows—India (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Data sourced from the International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund and national sources. 
Significant reform and restructuring have swept across emerging Asian financial systems 
since the 1997/98 crisis. The post-crisis reforms helped deepen and broaden the 
region’s financial sectors, with significant financial asset growth, particularly in the 
nonbanking sector, together with a strong rise in equity and bond markets (Table 4). 
Capital market development has made significant progress, expanding alternative 
means of corporate finance, such as equities and bonds. Nevertheless, the current crisis 
highlights an unfinished reform agenda and underlying structural weaknesses in the 
region's financial systems. The region's financial markets and institutions remain 
relatively underdeveloped and unsophisticated. Although their unsophisticated nature 
initially helped the region avoid being hit directly because of narrow exposure to toxic 
assets, limited tools for hedging and underdeveloped market infrastructure generally 
weakened investors' confidence and contributed to capital flight during the crisis. Despite 
significant progress since the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, the region's capital markets 
remain thin. Local currency bond markets are still in their infant stages in many regional 
economies, unable to provide reliable alternatives to bank lending. Also, in some 
economies, a narrow domestic investor base leaves the market susceptible to high 
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   2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 
China, People's Rep. of  168.8 204.5  8.8  33.9  27.1 32.3 16.9 50.3 
Hong Kong, China  505.5  640.7  196.4 573.8 363.9 610.9 35.8 42.9 
India
3  61.6 91.6 15.4 32.8 33.3 59.7 24.6 35.3 
Indonesia 63.6  48.6  8.8  13.7 18.7 21.7 31.9 13.4 
Korea, Rep. of  147.9  192.7  44.1 62.6 31.2 56.3 66.5 86.2 
Malaysia 154.2  190.3  16.5  20.2 124.7  89.6  74.8  73.5 
Philippines 99.2  78.8  22.4 18.5 76.8 54.3 27.6 33.7 
Singapore 683.8  707.9  39.1  47.1 243.7 148.0 48.0 70.8 
Taipei,China 259.9  289.6  29.8 80.6 81.7 94.7  7.7  7.7 
Thailand 132.3  137.7  10.7  33.0 26.0 39.2 25.3 51.6 
Average
4 227.7  258.2  39.2  91.6  102.7 120.7  35.9  46.5 
Median 151.1  191.5  19.5  33.4 55.1 58.0 29.8 46.6 
     eurozone  230.0  315.8 142.1 169.3  —  — 124.2  69.4 
     Japan  227.5  230.9  118.5 132.1  71.7  55.8 97.4  193.4 
     United States  78.3  104.8 283.2 306.1 117.5 64.6 41.8 55.3 
 
1 Financial asset data for People's Rep. of China (PRC) for 2002 and 2007; Hong Kong, China for 2000 and 2007; 
Indonesia for 2001 and 2007; Malaysia for 2000 and 2007; and Japan for 2001 and 2004.       
2 Market capitalization as percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in local currency unit.       
3 Financial sector assets data for India in 2000 refers to FY ending March 2000; and for 2008 FY ending March 2008.   
4 Simple average. 
Sources:  
OREI staff calculations using data from national sources, CEIC, AsianBondsOnline, Bloomberg, World Economic 
Outlook Database April 2009, and World Federation of Exchanges.   
 
  
3.2  Responses to the Crisis 
In response to the global financial turmoil, Asian authorities used various policies to 
support their banking systems and ensure financial stability. While these policy 
responses ranged across a wide spectrum, from tending to the immediate crisis effects 
to addressing spillovers into the real economy, this section will focus on the measures 
aimed at restoring financial stability. The main thrust of the policy measures in response 
to the crisis has been to ensure sufficient funding in credit markets, restore public 
confidence, and prevent systemic failures. Korea was the most aggressive in pursuing 
such measures, while authorities in the PRC; several Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) members; Hong Kong, China; and Taipei,China were also active 
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As the effect of the financial crisis was most acute in terms of currency volatility and 
external funding conditions, the most common measures taken by authorities were 
exchange market interventions and swap arrangements. Along with these, liquidity 
support and the blanket provision or extension of bank deposit insurance coverage were 
commonly used to ensure public confidence in banking systems. Several governments 
also supplemented deposit guarantees by issuing guarantees for the banks' foreign 
liabilities (e.g., Indonesia and Korea). Taken together, the monetary, liquidity support 
and deposit and other guarantees appear to have been broadly successful in 
maintaining confidence in the banks as no real bank runs have been recorded in the 
region.  
Several governments also supported banks by providing funds to shore up bank capital 
and share prices that had been affected by the financial crisis and/or the slowdown in 
growth. For example, India infused capital to commercial banks to boost their capital 
adequacy ratios to 12%; the PRC directed a state-owned fund to acquire additional 
equity in banks; Hong Kong, China established a Contingent Bank Capital Facility; Korea 
set aside funds for the same purpose; and Malaysia announced its readiness to facilitate 
bank recapitalization. So far, it is not evident that the region's banks have accessed 
these facilities. Instead, banks from several countries have been able to raise capital 
from the markets. Nevertheless, while the growth outlook recently appears to have 
reached a tentative inflection point, the downside risks continue to be high for further 
deterioration in the performance of emerging Asian banks and their capital positions. 
Some authorities opted for regulatory forbearance or eased prudential requirements. 
Indonesia suspended mark-to-market valuation for certain bank assets. Korea eased 
several prudential rules and delayed the adoption of Basel II requirements until 2010. 
The Philippines allowed banks to transfer securities from the trading to the investment 
book, excluded unrealized mark-to-market losses from the calculation of regulatory 
ratios, and gave favorable treatment in the risk weights of guaranteed bank assets. 
Finally, several countries adopted measures in the securities markets to restore 
confidence and stem the outflow of funds. The PRC encouraged state enterprises to 
conduct share buybacks. Indonesia closed its stock market for a few days, temporarily 
banned the short selling of equity, suspended bonds auctions, encouraged state 
enterprise to buy back shares, forbid sales of derivatives to bank depositors, and banned 
the sale of structured derivative products altogether. Korea also banned short selling, 
allowed pension funds to invest in bonds of healthy corporations, and liberalized access 
of sovereign wealth funds to domestic securities markets. Malaysia increased the size of 
a state-owned fund that invests in domestic securities, while Taipei,China banned short 
sales and eased terms for margin loans.  
Asian authorities’ policy responses have been swift and aggressive compared with the 
1997/98 financial crisis. The speed and magnitude of measures taken have helped 
mitigate the immediate crisis impact and avoid more serious systemic stress. Despite 
their short-term stabilizing effects, however, many of these measures have major 
drawbacks. Accommodative policies such as state guarantees and regulatory 
forbearance tend to create moral hazard and breed future problems. Most of these 
measures also entail significant costs. Direct capital injections can add significant Beyond the Crisis: Financial Regulatory Reform in Emerging Asia  |       15 
 
 
contingent risks to a government’s fiscal position, with the possibility of large losses at 
the expense of taxpayers. Frequent interventions in foreign exchange and stock markets 
also do not seem to have much visible effect on stabilizing either currencies or equity 
prices—although the simple fact of intervention can have a considerable negative 
reputational effect in the long run.  
Ad hoc national policy responses can also create conflicts of interest among the region's 
economies, often leading to suboptimal levels of policy support. As the crisis intensified 
rapidly in the latter half of 2008, emerging Asian governments raced to protect their 
financial systems and bolster foreign investor confidence in their markets. Without a 
regionally coordinated approach, competition among the region's financial systems could 
have easily led to inefficient or wasteful policy support. For example, the introduction of a 
blanket guarantee in one economy can force a competing economy to follow suit where 
authorities otherwise might not have done so. The result may be excessive policy 
support with potentially large corresponding costs.  
A well-established crisis management framework reduces the risk of policy mistakes and 
greater costs in addressing financial crises. Monetary and liquidity support along with 
deposit and other guarantees have succeeded thus far in maintaining confidence in the 
region’s banking systems (e.g., there have been no bank runs). However, few 
economies have systemic guidelines in responding to crises. For example, when 
providing capital and liquidity, few governments have specified criteria that trigger a 
support mechanism. And when such support mechanisms do exist, state-owned banks 
are usually the beneficiaries. State guarantees for depositors and credits for small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been repeatedly expanded. In the case of 
Taipei,China, it took only 1 day for authorities to expand the scope of deposit guarantees 
to unlimited coverage. Given the significant moral hazard and financial cost that 
stabilization measures might entail, there should be clear conditions and criteria under 
which financial institutions can avail of public sector support.     
3.3  Challenges to Existing Regulatory Regimes 
The current crisis has demonstrated that the risk-assessment and management 
capabilities that have been built since the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis remain 
insufficient and need to be upgraded after a thorough review of new challenges. There is 
a fundamental weakness in using an exclusively micro-prudential approach towards 
supervision as it tends to overlook financial spillovers and externalities in times of stress. 
While better regulatory and supervisory oversight has improved the soundness of 
individual banks, financial interdependence has intensified as banks diversify lines of 
business and new products, and services blur the boundaries of banking. In addition, the 
complexity of structured credit products—often involving high leverage, the unbundling 
and repackaging of risk, and credit enhancement—is challenging the ability of banks and 
financial regulators to fully assess the risks involved. In sum, marked changes in the 
banking environment have rendered existing regulatory approaches somewhat outdated. 
Innovation, deregulation, and globalization continue to impact the region's evolving 
banking and financial industry. As a result, the rapidly changing financial landscape 
requires a review of and adjustment to current regulatory and supervisory regimes. The 16          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 34  
 
financial regulatory and supervisory framework changed significantly after the 1997/98 
Asian financial crisis, driven by banking sector consolidation, growing financial 
disintermediation, and the evolving business of banking. However, the emergence of 
new products and services, and the increasing role of nonbank financial institutions, 
continue to pose challenges to the regulatory environment. Increased globalization also 
means global financial conditions increasingly affect the health of the region's banking 
and financial systems. During the current crisis, for example, the repatriation of funds by 
global financial institutions put significant pressure on local banks' foreign currency 
resources and, in some cases, threatened their financial soundness. The crisis presents 
an opportune time to review and make required adjustments to the reform measures 
implemented in the wake of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis.  
Overall, the region's banking regulatory and supervisory frameworks have become more 
rule-based—as opposed to the discretionary, relationship-based frameworks in place 
prior to 1997. Rules and norms in bank supervision across the region now appear to be 
broadly consistent with international standards. Market entry and ownership criteria, 
capital and liquidity requirements, prudential requirements, banking activities, auditing 
and disclosure requirements, and corporate governance all generally comply with 
international standards (Appendix 1). Nevertheless, there remain vast differences across 
emerging Asia in the institutional setup for financial regulation and supervision (Table 6). 
This largely reflects the varying stages of financial development and differences in the 
structure of financial systems. The 1997/98 Asian financial crisis played a catalytic role 
in reforming the region’s regulatory and supervisory regimes. One of the key 
considerations at the time was how to integrate and streamline the regulatory structure. 
For example, both Korea and Taipei,China now have single, integrated financial 
regulators separate and independent from their respective former regulators. In 
Singapore and Viet Nam, the central bank is the single regulator for all financial services. 
In most cases, however, the central bank remains the banking regulator. Even in Korea 
and Taipei,China, where the single financial regulator also oversees banks, the central 
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•  Assessments of the BCP for effective banking supervision reveal that 
compliance was generally lower in Asian jurisdictions compared with the 
global reference sample. 
Observance of compliance with principles on licensing and structure, methods of 
supervision, accounting and disclosure, and consolidated and cross-border 
supervision were found to be lower in Asian economies than the global average. For 
this particular cluster of principles, the incidences of materially compliant to non-
compliant with the standards were generally higher among Asian economies. On the 
other hand, full compliance with BCP requirements on prudential regulations and on 
corrective/remedial powers were higher than the average benchmark, even though 
there were also more observations of non-compliance among assessed Asian 
economies. It is noteworthy that in Asia and elsewhere there were some difficulties 
in assessing compliance with BCP on the objectives, independence, and powers of 
the supervisor.  
•  Asian jurisdictions also scored lower than the global average in the 
assessment of compliance with ICP. 
Serious shortcomings were found in the organization of insurance supervision in 
Asia compared to the global benchmark, as no Asian jurisdictions were found to 
either fully or largely observe this principle. Compliance with ICP principles on 
prudential rules, monitoring and inspection, and coordination and cooperation was 
generally lower in Asia, with the incidences of non-compliant to materially non-
compliant much higher than average. However, as a group, Asia scored much better 
than the global average for licensing, market conduct, and imposing sanctions.  
•  Assessment of compliance with IOSCO principles showed that Asian 
economies implemented these principles more consistently than the global 
average. 
Asia as a group was particularly strong relative to the global average in the 
implementation of IOSCO principles in collective investment schemes and 
disclosure of information by issuers. But Asia had lower scores relating to 
supervisory powers and independence, the role of self-regulatory entities, and the 
cluster of principles that included clearance and settlement functions. Otherwise, the 
implementation of the other principles by Asia was generally observed to be close to 
the global average. 
3.4  Reform Measures: How to Close Regulatory Gaps 
Specific reform measures are emerging in international forums to address regulatory 
gaps; those that caused the crisis and hampered corrective measures afterwards. Based 
on initiatives from the Group of Seven (G7),
5 Group of Twenty (G20),
6 Financial Stability 
                                                  
5  As early as August 2007, some international responses started to emerge to calm volatile financial 
markets, which originated from the US subprime mortgage market. The Group of Seven (G7) finance 
ministers who met in Washington DC in October 2007 requested the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to 





8 recommendations for regulatory and supervisory reform are 
being developed with detailed implementation plans. The following section focuses on 
these measures and related issues that have strong implications for emerging Asia’s 
financial systems. 
Revamping regulatory structures 
Regulatory reform should eliminate gaps and overlaps, avoid regulatory arbitrage, 
increase transparency, and improve coordination among relevant authorities. The crisis 
revealed fragmentation in current supervisory and regulatory structures. In economies 
without unified financial supervision, a lack of coordination among different regulatory 
agencies—such as information sharing—hinders effective monitoring and an 
understanding of the risks that are closely tied to intertwined financial institutions and 
market segments. Even in economies with unified supervisors, particularly those based 
outside the central bank, there remains the need for greater cooperation and information 
sharing. A new and revamped regulatory structure needs to address the gaps arising 
from incomplete cooperation and communication among different regulatory agencies, 
and identify clearly who has the final legal authority to sanction or bail out individual 
institutions and implement policies to safeguard financial stability. Regardless of the 
institutional arrangements for supervision—whether unitary, “twin-peaks,”
9 or  multiple 
                                                                                                                                                
FSF report was tabled in April 2008, which was updated in October 2008 and again in April 2009. 
Initially, these recommendations did not address specific regulatory structures or expanding the scope 
of regulation, but rather focused on broad issues related to improving the existing international financial 
architecture. 
6  With the crisis worsening—despite policy measures taken by advanced economies—it became clear 
that the G7 could not address those issues requiring more comprehensive global resolution. The Group 
of Twenty (G20) met in Washington DC on 14–15 November 2008 to craft more comprehensive and 
multilateral measures to stop the financial panic and avoid a major global recession. At the end of their 
Washington summit, G20 leaders endorsed common principles for reform of the international financial 
system and established five working groups to review and recommend how to strengthen transparency 
and accountability; enhance sound regulation; promote integrity in financial markets; reinforce 
international cooperation; and reform International Financial Institutions. 
7  The Financial Stability Forum (FSF)—founded in 1999 to promote international financial stability—
brings together finance ministers, central bankers, financial regulators, and international financial bodies. 
Following the G20 London summit in April 2009, the FSF was renamed the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) with all G20 countries as members. The FSB is mandated to address vulnerabilities and to 
develop and implement strong regulatory, supervisory, and other policies in the interest of financial 
stability. 
8  At the London summit, the G20 also requested the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to tackle long-
term and multilateral challenges of strengthening financial regulation while helping mitigate the short 
term impact of the crisis. The IMF will assume a greater role in monitoring and surveillance of global 
financial activities and individual member countries' compliance with their policy obligations. In an effort 
to enhance the global regulatory and supervisory system, the IMF has recommended the adoption of 
more comprehensive perimeters for regulation, enhancing transparency with adequate disclosure 
requirements to determine the systemic importance of institutions, and strengthen its oversight.  
9  "Twin peaks" is an approach in which there is separation of regulatory functions between two regulators 
by objective. For example, in Australia, regulatory responsibilities are split between two entities—one 
supervises the safety and soundness of financial institutions and systems and the other focuses on 
conduct-of-business regulation.  24          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 34  
 
supervisors—legal authority, information sharing, and effective coordination remain 
critical for effective crisis management.   
While there is no “one-size fits all” approach to regulatory structure, there is growing 
acceptance of an integrated approach to macro-prudential oversight and financial 
stability. The lack of a centralized approach to monitoring potential systemic risk and 
ensuring financial stability has been identified as a major regulatory gap in many 
advanced economies. Whether a country follows the approach of a single unified 
supervisor or several supervisors may not be as critical as having a structure with clear 
objectives and supervisors with the authority and legal power to regulate and take 
effective action, especially in resolving financial distress. Although there is sizeable 
literature on the issue of a single unified supervisor versus multiple supervisors,
10 little 
evidence has been found that one regulatory structure is universally better than the 
others (Barth et al., 2004). Nevertheless, the blurring of activities among financial service 
providers, together with the emergence of financial conglomerates (financial institutions 
doing a variety of financial business), poses regulatory challenges in which a number of 
agencies have different objectives and share different regulatory responsibilities. Any 
new regulatory structure should be flexible enough to meet the challenges of a rapidly 
changing regulatory environment, while allowing for a centralized approach to macro-
prudential oversight and determining systemic risk.  
Lessons from the recent financial turmoil call for reconsidering the supervisory role of 
central banks. Central banks—in the role of "lenders of last resort" and monitors of 
financial stability—must have timely access to information on banking as well as 
developments in other financial segments. According to a recent survey by the IMF 
(Seelig and Novoa, 2009), almost all banking supervisors consider monitoring systemic 
risks and maintaining financial stability to be part of their mandates. Supervisors of other 
financial services, such as insurance and securities, gave little importance to these 
systemic aspects. Whether a central bank should also be a bank regulator is subject to 
debate. However, the governance arrangement of supervisory agencies is central to 
their effectiveness. Recent studies suggest that supervisory authorities' independence 
may enhance the safety and soundness of a banking system while promoting bank 
efficiency (Barth et al., 2009). The IMF study showed that 75% of agencies surveyed 
legally possessed operational independence over supervisory decisions, but only 58% 
had independence for regulatory activities. Currently, the majority of the region's bank 
supervisors are also located within central banks. Thus, the region's central banks tend 
to have responsibility for both banking supervision and monetary policy. Nevertheless, it 
is important to ensure that the supervisory arm of the central bank maintains its 
independence from the central bank's monetary policy division. 
Broadening regulatory parameters 
The crisis highlighted the need to extend supervision over a wider set of market 
segments and institutions, especially those deemed systemically important. Financial 
regulators have always faced the challenge of balancing public policy objectives with 
market innovation. They need to safeguard financial stability and protect the general 
                                                  
10  For a detailed review of existing studies, see Barth et al. (2002). Beyond the Crisis: Financial Regulatory Reform in Emerging Asia  |       25 
 
 
public, while not stifling market incentives to innovate and diversify risks. At the onset of 
the current financial crisis, many nonbank financial institutions—non-life insurance, 
monoline insurance, hedge funds, private equity funds, specials investment vehicles 
(SIVs)—were either lightly regulated or not regulated at all. However, the crisis showed 
that these institutions, either individually or collectively, can pose risks to financial 
stability or trigger contagion when they are closely connected to regulated entities and 
have a concentration of assets that give rise to systemic risks.  
For any financial institution (whether bank or nonbank), many argue that systemic risks 
should be linked to operations and asset–liability structure. This leaves their legal 
status—for example, as banks, insurers, SIVs—a secondary concern. Yet, it remains 
unclear what constitutes systemic importance, how it is defined, and how it should be 
monitored. Indeed, standard stress testing of individual financial institutions proved 
inadequate in identifying those that posed systemic risk. Tests of systemic risk can be 
strengthened by assessing the financial institution’s position and influence in the market, 
as well as its size. Because of its size or market influence, a specific financial institution 
could be an individual entity that poses systemic risk. Determining this could be 
reinforced through stress tests using traditional methods, such as VaR-based models. 
As a next step, the model could be strengthened by including incremental risk factors of 
identified weaknesses. A financial entity could also pose systemic risk because it may 
likely trigger “herd behavior” due to its swathe or position in the market.  
Recent studies (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008) suggest that CoVaR—the VaR of 
financial institutions conditional on other institutions being in distress—can be a useful 
device in determining the systemic risk posed by such an institution. This method can 
capture the risk spillovers from one institution to another. For example, the financing 
constraints of individual institutions could force them to unwind when the risk estimated 
by individual VaR rises, pushing margin and capital requirements higher. In times of 
market stress, forced asset sales could lead to an increase in market risk, thus feeding 
back into the measured risk. The co-risk measure, or CoVaR, estimates the extent to 
which an individual institution is exposed to such systemic risk, in addition to its own risk 
as measured by VaR.     
Another related concern is that specific national reform proposals are likely to err on the 
side of over-regulation, given the highlighted role that hedge funds and over-the-counter 
derivatives played leading up to the crisis. The existence of strong asset management 
funds and the availability of various financial products are essential elements of a deep 
and liquid financial market. Over-regulation and discouraging financial innovation could 
be particularly harmful if post-crisis reforms were to deter necessary capital market 
development in emerging Asia, where many economies still struggle to develop their 
capital markets and provide adequate systemic support and market infrastructure. 
Strengthening prudential requirements 
There is broad agreement among financial regulators that existing capital adequacy 
requirements must be increased and supplemented by a forward-looking assessment of 
risks. There have been recommendations for bringing back a simple fixed-minimum 
leverage ratio for capital. This would serve as the first line of defense, not for 26          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 34  
 
safeguarding the bank itself, but for depositors as represented by the deposit insurance 
agency, and ultimately taxpayers. If this minimum capital level were breached, it would 
trigger regulators to demand immediate corrective action. In addition, the minimum 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) should be set higher and supplemented by additional 
charges or provisioning based on forward-looking assessments of emerging risks 
stemming from liquidity, higher leverage, or procyclicality. 
Emerging Asian authorities should strengthen bank liquidity management and 
supervision by determining whether their banks could fall victim to problems 
encountered by institutions in advanced economies. A global standard on proper liquidity 
management is evolving rapidly. The financial crisis showed that liquidity management 
using the minimum CAR for liquidity and leverage risks is inadequate. Several 
mechanisms are being considered to supplement the minimum CAR—for example, use 
of an additional capital charge linked to a mismatch in the asset–liability maturity 
structure. New capital adequacy requirements should also take account of a leverage 
ratio to dampen excessive leverage. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) already unveiled enhanced capital requirements for structured products and 
securitization.
11  
The crisis showed that the riskiness of a bank’s assets is intimately linked to a bank’s 
funding source and its term structure. Regulators did not pay sufficient attention to the 
source and maturity structure funding a bank’s asset expansion and growth. Excessive 
reliance on short-term funding during booms—particularly when interest costs and 
margins are low—tends to increase the fragility of the financial system. Accordingly, a 
capital charge on the maturity mismatch from the funding of asset–liability growth would 
help dampen a bank’s reliance on short-term funding and procylicality. This means that 
banks with medium- to long-term assets that have low market liquidity—and those that 
funded these assets with short-term liabilities—must hold additional capital. This 
additional capital charge would then force banks to internalize risks from maturity 
mismatches that give rise to funding liquidity risks. A multiple of CAR set as a function of 
the months of effective mismatch between asset maturity and funding maturity could be 
used for the additional capital charge for maturity mismatches. To do this, supervisors 
need to develop a new database, which would best be done in coordination with macro-
prudential supervisors and the industry to agree on a method to match pooled assets 
with pooled funding, and determine the effective maturities of assets and their funding. 
The capital adequacy requirement should also take into account the amount of leverage 
undertaken by a bank or nonbank financial institution. Setting the explicit leverage ratio 
may serve as an upper bound to leverage during a boom period. The amount of 
leverage of a bank or nonbank financial institution would need to be reviewed by taking 
into account links to off-balance sheet exposures and other contingent liabilities. The 
additional capital charge for exceeding the leverage ratio can be a multiple of CAR or 
derived using a function of the amount of deviation from the established ratio, which will 
                                                  
11  Two important global standard setters are documenting new guidelines for prudential requirements. 
First, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published Principles for Sound Liquidity 
Risk Management and Supervision in June 2008. Second, the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS) published Technical Advice on Liquidity Risk Management (Second Part) in 
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increase as the deviation widens. The combination of these additional capital charges 
should be applied to the basic CAR, as in Tier 1 capital. The more a bank engages in 
risky activities—as measured by asset growth, maturity mismatches, liquidity pressures, 
and leverage—the higher the multiple in CAR it would have to set aside.  
Similarly, regulators should introduce buffers above regulatory minimums, improve the 
quality of assets, monitor sensitivity to market and liquidity risks, and develop 
international guidelines to ensure consistency in minimum prudential requirements that 
will incorporate countercyclical buffers. For example, regulators should pay attention to 
the loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. During boom periods, asset price inflation tends to 
encourage leveraged investment in real estates for potential capital gains, leading to a 
rise in LTV ratios. However, this may precipitate deterioration of bank balance sheets 
when the housing boom ends in a burst. In this regard, there is a case for setting a 
maximum LTV—for example, 90% as a prudent ratio. Regulators should then be in a 
position to closely monitor market developments and formulate triggers to lower the LTV 
ratio progressively as the housing market, or any other asset market, heats up. 
Reducing procyclicality 
There is growing support for counteracting the procylicality of capital and liquidity 
requirements through the business cycle. Several mechanisms are being considered for 
creating countercyclical capital buffers and dynamic provisioning (Appendix 2). One 
example is the requirement for higher capital levels during normal times, which could be 
used to absorb losses in a downturn. A second is to consider countercyclical or through-
the-cycle provisioning. It has long been argued that loan loss provisioning is often 
backward looking as it is mostly based on losses already incurred. With a short time 
horizon, the current loan loss provisioning creates delays in recognizing new risks, 
excessive risk-taking during boom periods, and regulatory arbitrage. In recent years, the 
enhanced risk sensitivity of Basel II capital requirements also exacerbated this 
procyclical behavior.  
There is merit in considering the implementation of dynamic provisioning that helps 
recognize credit risks posed by the possibility of expected future losses; it can also limit 
excessive bank credit growth. The rational for dynamic provisioning is that the risk of 
expected losses tends to rise as the economic cycle matures. Thus, the use of a metric 
that captures the increasing rate of credit growth also measures rising expected losses. 
This triggers additional provisioning on top of the specific one as a buffer in the upswing 
phase of credit growth and vice versa in a downswing. Additional provisioning lowers net 
credit and is reflected as an expense, thus affecting profitability. Since it was introduced 
by the Bank of Spain in 2000, this mechanism has been widely touted as a good 
example of a countercyclical measure. There are some complications, however, in 
applying the Spanish example elsewhere. The use of generic provisioning contravenes 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) principles, which state that provisioning must 
be based on incurred losses or evidence of credit impairment. This conflict did not create 
a problem for Banco de Espana, as it also sets the accounting standard. But for most 
other regulators, adopting dynamic provisioning would create conflict with IAS 
compliance. Related concerns include the possibility that this mechanism would interfere 
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to deferred taxes if not deductible as an expense. There is growing support for 
recognizing the importance of prudential requirements that may take precedence over 
accounting principles and a review of IAS principles is underway.  
Another more direct countercyclical mechanism would be to add a capital charge linked 
to a measure of excessive credit growth. Regulators would need to develop, ideally in 
coordination with macro-prudential supervisors and industry stakeholders, a measure of 
normal sustainable loan growth consistent with financial stability and the long-term 
growth of the economy. When a bank’s loan growth exceeds the agreed growth path, it 
triggers an additional charge on capital. The mechanism would be dynamic if the 
multiple on capital rises as the trend of loan growth deviates farther away from the 
agreed path. As the boom continues, this would result in a larger capital buffer. Similarly, 
in a downturn the surcharge would be progressively lowered—below one if the situation 
worsened dramatically. The Central Bank of Brazil introduced such a capital charge in 
2000 through a mechanism that links the deviation of credit growth relative to GDP 
growth.  
Formalizing macro-prudential supervision 
System-wide, macro-prudential supervision (MPS) must be developed to complement 
existing micro-prudential regulation. High leverage tends to magnify profits during booms 
for individual institutions, while leading to huge system-wide losses during crises. 
Moreover, the micro-prudential approach encourages banks to be more reluctant and 
conservative when lending during an economic downturn. This hurts the economy by 
depressing economic activity and deepening the business cycle trough. Risks also stem 
from interdependences between banks and lightly regulated nonbank entities through 
their operations, diversification of risks, and participation in innovative financial 
instruments. The ups and downs of the economic cycle need to be better integrated 
through MPS. 
MPS aims to ensure financial system stability by focusing on overall market trends or 
turning points—factors that can signal emerging systemic risks. Strengthening macro-
prudential capabilities in no way implies that micro-prudential measures are wrong or no 
longer needed. Rather, the global crisis clearly showed that micro-prudential supervision 
is insufficient on its own and would be more effective if complemented by MPS. There is 
as yet no clear agreement on what an MPS framework should look like and the 
instruments needed to operationalize MPS are not well defined. Establishing an MPS 
approach requires caution to ensure that the main objectives for attaining financial 
stability are met, while taking into account the basic cost–benefit assessment of the 
large information needs that MPS is likely to entail. This would include defining policy 
targets to monitor, developing instruments to respond to deviation from targeted trends, 
and addressing governance issues. It is also important to specify which supervisory or 
government authority will be in charge and held accountable.  
An effective MPS framework requires comprehensive supervision and analysis of how a 
failure in any segment of a financial system—whether bank- or nonbank-related—affects 
the risks associated with any other segment or the system as a whole. Many national 
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from a system-wide perspective based on how the resilience of the system can be 
assessed. The introduction of dynamic provisioning and/or additional capital 
requirements may help address identified risks emerging from rapid loan growth in a 
boom cycle and the effects of deleveraging and asset sales during a downturn. At the 
global level, international institutions are attempting to define an effective MPS 
framework. The Financial Stability Board (FSB), for example, is working with the IMF to 
develop early warning indicators of evolving macroeconomic and financial risks. It is 
critical that emerging Asian economies contribute to this process by providing inputs for 
the development of early warning indicators specific to their national systems, while 
ensuring that these indicators are fully incorporated into their regulatory systems and 
shared among supervisors and regulators of all financial sector segments. 
Improving accounting standards and credit rating systems 
Mark-to-market, or fair value, accounting should continue to be the benchmark. However, 
in the run-up to the crisis, the combination of mark-to-market accounting and the 
procyclical characteristics of asset prices appears to have contributed to the delay in 
recognizing the risks and interdependencies that accrued during the boom period. The 
global financial crisis illustrated that strict adherence to mark-to-market accounting 
principles could exacerbate bank losses, liquidity problems, and the downward asset 
price spiral. To alleviate this, regulators could ask banks to pool assets together that can 
be matched to a pool of liabilities funding such assets. The assets would then be placed 
in a "hold-to-funding account," which would be linked to the maturity of the funding, 
rather than be subject to mark-to-market or fair market valuations. This tool would help 
preserve the value of bank assets during periods when market disruptions hamper 
appropriate asset pricing. It would also preserve systemic stability by reducing market 
illiquidity brought about by forced asset sales from strict adherence to mark-to-market 
accounting. 
The crisis identified several flaws in the design and function of credit rating agencies. 
The complex nature of structured products led to heavy reliance on rating agencies in 
assessing the exposures to different layers of structured products, and in monitoring 
their secondary market performance. Traditionally, credit rating agencies enhance 
transparency, support capital market development, and encourage financial innovation. 
But several flaws in the design and function of rating agencies helped cause or 
aggravate the current crisis. Rating agencies were found lax in rating structured credit 
products with short historical track records, thus relying overwhelmingly on mathematical 
models in defining risks. This created doubts in rating accuracy and model-based 
valuations. Credit rating downgrades of structured products triggered the liquidity 
squeeze and destroyed confidence in related products and the financial entities that 
were exposed to these instruments. Widespread concern over conflicts of interest and 
the analytical independence of rating agencies derives from the agency business 
model—based on compensation from the credit issuers and the fact that rating agencies 
usually act as issuers’ financial advisors. This has triggered discussions over whether 
credit rating agencies should be subject to formal regulatory oversight. Earlier proposals 
from the G20 and FSB left open the possibility of voluntary compliance by rating 
agencies with IOSCO standards on transparency and disclosure, governance, and 
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Enhancing corporate governance 
The crisis focused attention on flawed compensation incentives for financial managers 
and traders that rewarded imprudent, short-term risk-taking. There is growing consensus 
that compensation schemes for financial managers and traders should be reviewed by 
supervisory authorities to ensure they do not reward excessive short-term risk-taking at 
the expense of longer-term value and financial stability. At the G20 meeting in London in 
April 2009, leaders endorsed principles on pay and compensation proposed by the FSB. 
Following this, the European Commission issued a communiqué and unveiled proposals 
that included supervisory oversight of the sustainability of compensation schemes.   
Promoting better cross-border cooperation 
The crisis showed that the established framework for cross-border coordination and 
cooperation—through, for example, memorandums of understanding or a college of 
supervisors—have limitations. In reforming crisis management frameworks, remedial or 
corrective actions need to be harmonized, particularly for large and systemically-
important, cross-border financial institutions. In the early stages of the crisis, there were 
issues with the cross-border movement of funds and assets to support liquidity or capital 
requirements of either the parent entity or the subsidiary/branch. Actions to widen 
guarantees on deposits and selected bank liabilities and similar measures were not 
coordinated, which in some instances added pressure to neighboring countries’ systems. 
Later on, there were problems with the resolution of cross-border banks and their 
operations.  
The supervision of liquidity management of cross-border banks lacks consistency, which 
became an important issue as liquidity across domestic and international capital markets 
tightened with the onset of the crisis. Regulators need a common set of liquidity 
parameters. Disruptive regulatory actions—such as the ring-fencing of liquid assets in 
the recent crisis—should be used only as a last resort. This requires better knowledge of 
how cross-border banks conduct their business. Large and complex cross-border banks 
internally manage liquidity in very diverse ways. Host and home supervisory and 
regulatory authorities need to ensure that these banks hold sufficiently high-quality liquid 
assets. 
A more effective cross-border bank resolution process needs to be established. The 
crisis showed that insolvency regimes need to be aligned across economies affected by 
cross-border bank failures. Delays and uncertainties during the height of the crisis broke 
potential deals and exacerbated contagion. For example, measures and processes for 
managing insolvent banks requiring close-out netting, managing creditor claims on 
collateral assets, or unwinding financial transactions are often designed for domestic 
operations. They fail to address cross-border banking insolvencies. A strengthened 
resolution framework would also help forestall unilateral actions that are tantamount to 
financial protectionism. There is a clear need for better information sharing and for 
cross-border burden sharing on costs.  
There are several models addressing cross-border issues, ranging at the extremes from 
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Realistically, the establishment of a supranational supervisory authority would involve 
prolonged political and legal negotiations. A common legal and regulatory framework 
would be needed for financial institutions to operate and be supervised, resolved, and 
liquidated. Credible mechanisms for coordination, burden sharing, and crisis 
management must be in place. While it is difficult to imagine that a supranational 
supervisor could emerge anytime soon, the opposite measure—establishing rigid 
operational control of cross-border banks by the host regulator—would be a deep 
setback to the benefits of financial integration. A middle path needs to be found that 
incorporates elements of cross-border liquidity management, alignment of insolvency 
regimes, and better sharing of financial burden and information.  
 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks  
Emerging Asia must play its part in ensuring that new financial architecture meets both 
the challenges of globalized finance and the region’s financial development agenda. The 
absence of a global mechanism to supervise the increasingly globalized financial system 
exposed serious problems during the crisis. Reform of the global financial architecture is 
underway. Emerging Asia must take its place in this new architecture by actively 
participating at all levels of governance. In doing so, authorities in emerging Asia, both 
individually and collectively, need to address weaknesses in their financial systems, 
improving both functionality and integrity. Detailed action programs focusing on crisis 
prevention and improving crisis management can be coordinated regionally in line with 
the initiatives of the G20, FSB, and IMF. Given its financial evolution since the 1997/98 
Asian financial crisis, plus reactions to the spillover from the current global turmoil, the 
region needs to significantly contribute to these international and regional work programs. 
While reinforcing efforts for effective regional cooperation, emerging Asia also needs to 
play a proactive role in ensuring macroeconomic and financial stability at the global level. 
This will require assuming greater responsibility in correcting global macroeconomic and 
structural imbalances.  
An important distinction should be made between the basic elements of capital market 
development and risky financial innovation. Many economies in the region continue to 
face the challenge of developing capital markets to efficiently channel domestic savings 
into productive investment. For emerging Asia, where banks remain the main channel for 
financial intermediation, building a strong banking system remains paramount. However, 
authorities must also foster a broader range of markets—including corporate bond 
markets, securitization, and derivatives—to enhance financial system resilience. Much of 
the region still lacks essential financial services—authorities need to encourage greater 
public access to banking; provide credit to promote entrepreneurship; diversify savings 
instruments; and develop appropriate products to manage risk. Thus, at this stage, it is 
important to encourage simple innovations to provide a better array of financial services 
and products that cater to the needs of small entrepreneurs and investors. Many 
economies also need to establish, upgrade, or reform the basic market infrastructure for 
trading and settlement, all of which would help promote more efficient financial 
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The key challenge for the region’s regulators is how to encourage and manage financial 
market development without stifling innovation. Ideal regulation leaves space for 
innovation. Yet, unfettered innovation can generate risks of its own. The effects of past 
crises suggest that caution is needed. However, translating caution into a regulatory 
straitjacket stifles innovation, which has its own costs. Striking the right balance is the 
challenge, and it is not an easy one. Crises highlight the importance of adequate 
monitoring. Regulators should be wary of complex innovation that make the underlying 
risks of products or services more difficult to assess or trace—whether by bank 
management or the final investor. Innovative products also lack the historic data needed 
to apply appropriate stress testing. Regulators need to assess the impact of innovative 
products on the safety and soundness of financial institutions, risk management, investor 
protection, and financial stability in general.  
Emerging Asian economies should reinforce their cooperation on enhancing financial 
stability by accelerating regional initiatives. National mechanisms to stem the spread of 
financial panic were largely inadequate, ineffective, and inefficient in the face of massive 
deleveraging in advanced economies, tight international liquidity, and worsening growth 
prospects. Some Asian economies experienced severe disruptions in their currency and 
asset markets due to limited access to external funding sources. Although economies 
with sufficiently large international reserves were able to provide liquidity support to their 
banks and financial systems, holding vast reserves for rainy days has its own costs. 
Accumulating large current account surpluses is also often blamed for having 
contributed to global imbalances. Swap agreements with developed and financially 
strong emerging economies, regional reserve pooling, and access to funding from 
international financial institutions offer several alternatives for the region in managing 
short- to medium-term debt and financial flows. Many Asian economies have already 
negotiated swap arrangements with both developed and emerging economies. For 
example, Singapore and Korea established temporary swap lines with the US Federal 
Reserve of up to USD30 billion, Japan arranged similar deals with Indonesia and several 
other Asian countries, and the PRC made arrangements with several of its Asian trading 
partners. In addition, the recent multi-lateralization of the ASEAN+3 Chiang Mai 
Initiative
12   further institutionalizes the arrangement through an agreement on the 
operational rules governing fund access, voting rights, and contributions.  
In the medium- to long-term, national financial regulators should agree on how to 
harmonize and work towards convergence of regulatory approaches and prudential 
                                                  
12  The decision by ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers to expedite multi-lateralization of the CMI and to enlarge 
commitments was an important confidence building step during the crisis. At the ASEAN+3 Finance 
Ministers Meeting in Madrid 2008, ministers agreed to create a multilateral currency swap deal worth 
about USD84 billion. The February 2009 ASEAN+3 meeting in Phuket raised this commitment from 
USD80 billion to UDS12 billion. Subsequently in May, on the side of the ADB annual meeting in Bali, 
ASEAN agreed on national contributions to the pool and voting rights, along with the procedures for 
disbursement and repayment of funds. Also, ASEAN+3 will establish a permanent independent 
surveillance unit to promote objective economic monitoring and operationalize the reserve pool by the 
end of the year. Rules and restrictions governing the amount members can draw from the pool of 
foreign currency reserves would also be eased, especially given the IMF's new Short-Term Liquidity 
Facility that enables certain countries to borrow without conditions. Once the regional surveillance unit 
becomes fully operational, the amount that member countries can withdraw will be fully de-linked from 
IMF conditionality. These are the seeds of regional institution building, which could facilitate greater 
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requirements. Rapid financial globalization requires substantial improvements to the 
supervision of cross-border financial activities and operation of cross-border banks and 
financial groups. Specifically, home and host supervisors should agree on what the 
critical functions of the cross-border financial entities are in their respective jurisdictions. 
They should then agree on a broad outline of actions that could be taken to preserve 
these functions. General agreement on how to minimize the likely cross-border spillover 
effects of such actions, if any, should be discussed and formalized. Finally, emerging 
Asian regulators and financial supervisors must work on these issues together with 
developed country authorities, and regional and international institutions, to ensure 
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Appendix 2:   Examples of Countercyclical Regulatory Measures 
 
The global financial crisis revealed an unintended problem with current regulations in 
that they actually encouraged the procyclical behavior of financial institutions, which thus 
aggravated the credit crunch. Recent criticism of the Basel II framework is that it 
reinforces the procyclicality of the financial system by increasing risk sensitivity in 
financial regulation. There is now growing demand for countercyclical measures using 
dynamic provisioning or additional capital buffers to help mitigate risks during the boom 
cycle and dampen the effects of deleveraging and asset sales during a downturn.  
Dynamic provisioning is a countercyclical regulatory measure that mitigates risks from 
rapid loan growth and the sharp credit retrenchment that may follow. The Bank of Spain 
applies measures that require additional provisions to be set aside (or utilized) based on 
a formula it provides. The formula can alternatively be an approved internal bank model. 
The summary formula for general provisioning (GP) is 
GP = α Δ Credit + β Credit – Specific Provisions      (1) 
The formula incorporates an adjustment for collective risk assessment (α) of credit 
growth over a defined period, latent risks derived from historical loan loss experience (β), 
the stock of outstanding credit, and specific provisions for incurred losses. The formula 
aims to capture the rising risk of default over time, provided that the loan is appropriately 
priced and the default premium is correctly set. 
Similarly, additional capital buffers for “excessive” credit growth provide a useful 
countercyclical tool. There are some simple methods for imposing countercyclical capital 
charges that are triggered by a definition of excessive bank asset growth. In 2000, the 
Central Bank of Brazil used a method that relied on a simple comparison of the growth 
rates of bank credit and gross domestic product (GDP). The ratio helped determine the 
capital buffer needed to help mitigate potential problems during a down cycle.  
In Brazil, credit tended historically to expand faster than GDP during economic upswings. 
In subsequent downturns, the loan loss provisions of Brazilian banks could not support 
normal operations, leading to stagnation in credit growth and creating a drag on 
economic recovery. The introduction of an additional capital charge as a function of 
credit growth in excess of GDP growth to serve as a buffer in the upswing mitigated the 
negative effects from the downturn that followed.  
The increased capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is calculated as a function of the excess 
growth in credit over GDP growth over a specified observation period. The larger the 
excess, the higher the additional capital charge levied. The additional capital charge 
(ACC) is determined by 
  ACC = α (Δ Credit – Δ GDP)                 (2) 
such that α would rise as the positive deviation of (Δ Credit – Δ GDP) grows. During a 
downturn, (Δ Credit – Δ GDP) could become negative and α could drop below unity. 44          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 34  
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